This paper considers a manufacturer-retailer supply chain for a seasonal product whose demand is weather-sensitive. The retailer orders from the manufacturer (supplier) prior to the selling season and then sells to the market. We examine how a manufacturer can structure a weather-linked rebate to improve his expected profit. The proposed class of rebate contracts offers several advantages over many other contract structures, including no required verification of leftover inventory and/or markdown amounts, and no adverse effect on sales effort by the retailer.
Introduction
Weather represents an important determinant of demand for many products. According to an estimate by the U.S. National Research Council, 46% of U.S. GDP is affected by weather.
In the retail sector, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. reported in June 2005 that its inventory levels were higher than normal for the second straight quarter as below-normal temperatures crimped demand ( These examples are anecdotal evidence of the effect of weather on demand, but the overall impacts are pervasive. Niemira (2005) argues that weather influences sales primarily through its effect on economic activity. Broader and more systematic studies (e.g., Starr-McCluer 2000) document a significant impact of weather on retail sales at an aggregate level, although the primary effect may be that of shifting demand earlier or later. When the product of concern is a seasonal product, however, shifts in timing of aggregate retail demand translate into shifts of demand from one (type of) product to another (type of) product.
It is now possible to observe a wide range of atmospheric events in real time, to measure them with great precision and predict them with a good deal of accuracy. Extensive weather databases are now available (e.g., climetrix.com and weather-warehouse.com). Available data include high, low and average daily temperature, daily rainfall and snowfall, hourly data on humidity and cloud cover, and various indices such as heating and cooling degree days; these are available for thousands of locales around the world. Other governmental and private organizations (e.g., cpc.noaa,gov and longrangeweather.com) provide long term weather forecasts. Advances in information management and quantitative analysis tools facilitate the use of weather data for improved business decision-making (Dutton, 2002) . Regnier (2008) describes recent advances in weather forecasting and applications of operations research models that take advantage of this information for improved decision-making. The vast majority of these applications are for short term decision-making, such as adjusting airline schedules in response to weather events. Improved weather prediction allows retail firms to make mediumand short-term adjustments in decisions which may include changes in order quantities or prices. Sophisticated firms such as Fedex, UPS and various agriculture and energy companies now more commonly employ meteorologists to improve their ability to forecast and to use those forecasts in making business decisions (Lustgarten 2005).
Not only can firms avail themselves of better weather information, but they can also use weather-risk-management products to reduce profit fluctuations caused by the weather. Weather derivatives were introduced about a decade ago to enable firms to hedge weather risks. Sophisticated firms now use weather contracts or derivatives, such as options and futures, or combinations of both, to hedge against the financial impact of adverse weather and to smooth out their weather-sensitive earnings. Companies using such weather-risk-management products represent an array of sectors, including electric utilities, natural gas, propane/heating oil, construction, agriculture, food/beverage, restaurants/hospitality, retailing, outdoor entertainment, transportation, manufacturing, and banking/insurance, among others (Malinow, 2002) .
Weather risk derivatives and contracts are traded both on exchanges and over the counter. An active market exists on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and the volume of transacted weather-hedge derivatives reached $32 billion in 2007 (Davis 2008) . Payouts are determined by weather records in a specific location for a given time period. Consequently, they differ from weather insurance which requires proof of loss or an underlying interest. Weather insurance, like other insurance, usually includes additional clauses on the conditions in which the insurer is (or is not) liable, deductibles, and so forth. Furthermore, weather insurance, once purchased, is not cancellable whereas a weather derivative can be sold at market value. (Some firms of-fer what they call weather insurance, but the vast majority are simply customized weather derivative contracts.)
Until fairly recently, the vast majority of weather derivatives were based on weather indices such as heating degree days or cooling degree days, and firms in the energy industry were key traders in these markets, as these indices are highly correlated with energy demands. However, within the past two years, derivatives have become available for rainfall (Colin 2008;  http://www.rainprotection.net/about us) and for other types of weather-related indices that are somewhat more customized for the needs of different industries (Wood 2007) . Interestingly, even where customization has existed, the targeted industries have been primarily construction, agriculture, and other similar industries. It is only recently that firms offering weather derivatives have targeted retail firms, despite the fact that apparel specialty stores cannot easily diversify product offerings to reduce their exposure to weather risk (O'Donnell 2007).
Furthermore, despite the exponential growth in the market for weather derivatives and the use of more customized weather-risk-management products, details are often not made public because firms are reluctant to expose their points of vulnerability (Lustgarten 2005).
Retail firms now have access to weather derivatives based on indices that are more highly correlated with their demand than are traditional indices, and these firms also can purchase highly customized weather contracts such as those available from Weatherbill.com (cf.
http://www.weatherbill.com). A retailer's purchase of such a weather derivative or contract will mitigate his risk, but coordination of the supply chain (which we discuss in Section 3.1) is possible only if the manufacturer offers the contract because otherwise the effect of double marginalization remains.
There are, of course, means other than weather-linked contracts that retailers can use to mitigate the effect of weather-related risks on their overall profit, including choice of product assortment (e.g., products whose demands are affected differently by weather), flexible production (or subcontractor) capacity (including the ability to postpone product differentiation), logistics technology to support quick response, and the usual in-season and end-of season markdowns. While large retailers may be able to utilize (traded) weather options, the typical small to medium-sized specialty retailer often lacks the financial prowress to do so. Moreover, procurement managers can opt for a weather rebate offered by a manufacturer but rarely have the authority to purchase weather derivatives. As such, they may avail themselves of other means for mitigating the effects of weather on their profits.
With this as a backdrop, we explore weather-linked rebates. Our modeling framework is motivated more specifically by the following situation. Weatherproof Garment Company, which designs and manufactures cold-weather apparel, including outerwear, was concerned that unseasonably warm fall weather would crimp demand for its products. The company purchased a weather derivative brokered by Storm Exchange, a firm that provides weather-related financial hedging solutions. The weather derivative would provide up to $10 million in coverage if weather in December (2007) turned out to be unseasonably warm. The CEO of Weatherproof, Eliot Peyser, indicated that the derivative would enable the company to offer rebate incentives to its customers for placing early orders (Business Wire, December 3, 2007) .
With this motivating example in mind, we take the vantage point of a manufacturer that, for a variety of reasons including capacity limitations and the concomitant long production lead times that are so common in the apparel and other industries, wishes to offer a weather rebate to retailers to encourage them to purchase (or otherwise commit to) a large quantity well in advance of the selling season. The manufacturer recognizes the difficult-to-quantify yet very significant side-benefits that the weather rebate offers (e.g., no auditing of leftover inventory at the retailer that would be required in the case of buy-back contracts or markdown allowances) and needs to structure the contract and choose (or design, if he has that choice) a weather derivative that appropriately hedges his risk of offering the rebate.
More formally, we study a manufacturer-retailer supply chain for a seasonal product with weather-sensitive demand in a newsvendor context. The retailer chooses the order quantity and may take advantage of a manufacturer-offered weather rebate contract. (In Appendix D, we also allow for pricing decisions by both parties.) A weather-linked guarantee can be offered by a risk-neutral or risk-tolerant manufacturer (supplier) to protect the retailer from some of the potential financial effects. Such a guarantee can take the form of a rebate that is linked to a weather index (Malinow, 2002) .
To be concrete, we consider a scenario in which higher average seasonal temperatures lead to lower demand. As one example, studies by Storm Exchange, a weather-related risk manager, show that for every two degree (Fahrenheit) increase in the average temperature in September, sales at apparel specialty stores fall by 1% (Blumenthal 2007) . In reaction to a similar situation, a European clothing manufacturer tried to encourage retailers to buy its winter collection early by offering a rebate if mild weather prevailed. The winter collection is usually ordered by retailers in the spring to sell in late autumn and early winter.
If the winter weather is milder than usual, sales suffer and retailers are left with a surplus that they cannot sell the following year when fashions have changed (www.environmentalfinance.com/2004/0403mar/hedge.htm). There are, of course, other examples for which demand is increasing or non-monotonic in the temperature (or other weather metric). Weather Trends International has reported on the sensitivity of demand to temperature for over a dozen product categories. As an example, the demand for beer increases by 1.2% for each degree inNon-monotonic relationships typically arise when demand is either high or low for moderate temperature ranges and the reverse for extreme temperature ranges. Two examples are batteries, whose demands tend to be higher in extreme temperatures (cf. Shearer 1998), and soft drinks, whose demand is highest when the weather is warm but not exceedingly hot (see MSI Guaranteed Weather, undated). Our model allows for such relationships as well.
In the extreme case where demand and the weather index have a one-to-one correspondence, the contract that we propose is essentially contingent on the demand realization. Specifically, if the demand is below a specified level, then the rebate scheme is activated. Although researchers and practitioners have designed many contracts with the goal of increasing the supply chain's total profit, to the best of our knowledge, such a contract structure has not been studied in the literature. Several other types of contracts (see next section) can induce the retailer to order more than he would under a wholesale price contract by giving him some downside protection:
for example, if demand is lower than what he orders, the retailer receives a partial refund.
However, the weather-linked contract departs from these standard supply-chain contracts, as it is based on the weather index rather than actual realized demand or leftovers.
We study scenarios in which the manufacturer provides the retailer an incentive to purchase more than he might otherwise at a point in time long before the selling season by offering a rebate if the actual seasonal average temperature is higher than a pre-determined threshold, with the rebate amount increasing in the deviation of the average temperature above the threshold. Such incentives can coordinate the supply chain by encouraging the retailer to order more, and may also make the manufacturer more competitive among risk-averse retailers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on related research. In Section 3, we present a basic model in which prices are exogenous. The manufacturer decides the structure of the weather rebate and the retailer chooses the order quantity. We derive the structure of the supply-chain-coordinating weather rebate and show that it admits a variety of functional forms and allows for a good deal of flexibility in allocating profits and risks between the two parties while ensuring incentive compatibility (vis-a-vis the no-rebate scenario). Although prices could be decided in practice, this model is useful because it provides insight into the structure of the weather rebate unfettered by the algebraic complications of optimizing prices. The model also provides the basis for our exploration of how to take advantage of the contract's flexibility to design Pareto-improving, risk-free rebate structures, as well as rebate structures that limit the manufacturer's risk. In Appendix D in the Online Supplement, we extend the results to allow price setting by both parties.
In Section 4, we show how the manufacturer can limit his risk via the choice of contract parameters, and also show that for some classes of contract structures, it is possible for the manufacturer to completely hedge his risk of offering a rebate by paying a risk premium for a weather derivative of a form that is commonly traded in practice. In Section 5, we discuss how the retailer's risk can be limited. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Literature Review
There is an extensive literature on supply contracts in a newsvendor context, much of it focused on identifying contract structures that coordinate the supply chain or improve performance vis-a-vis a scenario with decentralized decision-making. In the interest of brevity, we refer the reader to surveys by Anupindi and Bassok (1999) , Lariviere (1999) Such concessions come in two main forms: buy backs and markdown agreements (or "markdown money"). Early-season incentives include advance purchase discounts and reservation contracts. We briefly discuss each in turn.
Under buy-backs, the retailer returns some or all of the excess inventory to the manufacturer for a full or partial refund. Padmanabhan and Png (1995) provide a brief history of returns arrangements and discuss their advantages and disadvantages. Among the advantages are mitigating the retailer's risk, safeguarding the brand from deterioration of the image due to stale and/or discounted product, and facilitating collection of more accurate demand data. The disadvantages of such a policy include logistics costs and lessened retailer incentive to sell the product. The literature on buy-back contracts includes Pasternack (1985) , Marvel and Peck (1995) , Lau and Lau (1995) , Kandel (1996) , Emmons and Gilbert (1998) , Lariviere (1999) , Taylor (2001 Taylor ( , 2002 , Glenn (2004) , and Krishnan et al. (2004) . Recognizing that both parties may not be better off under a returns contract, Webster and Weng (2000) derive a so-called "risk free" returns policy in which retailer's expected profit increases and the manufacturer is at least as well off for any demand outcome as when no returns are allowed. The policy is risk free provided that the retailer orders at least as much as he would without a rebate. Related issues are examined by Granot and Yin (2005) , who show that for certain demand functions, although a coordinating contract may exist, it may not be advantageous for the manufacturer to offer it or for the retailer to accept it. They also show that the benefits of coordination for the supply chain as a whole may be quite limited.
Under markdown agreements, the goods are not returned to the manufacturer, but the manufacturer fully or partially compensates the retailer for the lost margin on the inventory that must be discounted. Edelson (2005) provides a history of the use of markdown money and discusses how it affects incentives. Gottlieb (2005) argues that markdown money has disadvantages for both parties, such as blunting the incentive of retailers to forecast accurately and increasing risk and strains between manufacturers and customers. Tsay (2001) provides a comprehensive analysis of contracts with markdown provisions.
Markdown and buy-back arrangements can, in principle, be made equivalent from a financial standpoint. However, markdown agreements usually are established to protect the retailer's margins, and the retailer, not the manufacturer, has responsibility for the disposition of inventory that cannot be sold at full price. On the other hand, if buy-backs occur, the manufacturer has the burden of disposing excess goods. Tibben-Lemke (2004) describes an array of secondary markets available to both parties.
Our proposed rebate scheme shares one advantage of a markdown arrangement in that goods are not returned to the manufacturer, but it differs in that it is not designed to protect retail margins. Indeed, the rebate scheme need not limit the retailer's choices of prices or markdowns.
In addition, no verification of leftover inventory or the number of units sold at each price is required. Thus, once the contract is negotiated, implementation is trivial. Moreover, the retailer's incentives (e.g., to forecast accurately and to invest in sales effort) are aligned with those of the supply chain as a whole, and because no verification is required, there are no incentives for dishonest reporting. Advance purchase discounts and reservation contracts, like a weather rebate, involve no administrative effort at the end of the season. Advance purchase discounts put the risk in the hands of the retailer with some financial compensation for doing so.
Reservation contracts split the quantity risk and the financial risk between the manufacturer and retailer. On the other hand, the weather rebate puts the quantity and part of the financial risk in the hands of the retailer, and the manufacturer bears only financial risk. Finally, in contrast to contracts based on sharing (of profit, revenue, etc.), weather rebates require relatively little economic information to be shared between the parties.
In our motivating example, Weatherproof purchased a weather derivative to hedge its risk associated with offering weather rebates to retailers. We are not aware of any academic literature that has considered manufacturer-offered weather rebates, whether or not they are coupled with manufacturer-purchased weather derivatives to hedge the risk. However, several papers in the operations management literature have considered derivatives or similar financial instruments as hedges for risks faced by either the manufacturer or the retailer. These include Gaur and Seshadri (2005) We next analyze the retailer's and manufacturer's decisions and profits when prices are fixed.
The Basic Model
We consider a supply chain with two firms, a manufacturer and a retailer who sells a seasonal good with uncertain demand. In this basic model, we do not model the risk aversion of the parties in detail. However, we assume that the manufacturer is willing to bear some risk in exchange for a higher expected profit, and that the retailer may be willing to pay a risk premium to shift some of the risk to the manufacturer. Without these assumptions, a weather rebate contract is not sensible. Manufacturers of products whose demands are highly weathersensitive often sell in geographically distributed markets whose weather patterns are not highly correlated, and may offer products whose demands are countercyclical to one another. Thus, these manufacturers may be better able to bear some of the risks associated with weatherinduced demand uncertainty than, say, a specialty apparel retailer that cannot diversify easily.
The manufacturer has unit production cost c and as Stackelberg leader, chooses the contract terms and offers a wholesale price w. The retailer decides the order quantity, q and sells at a unit price p. Both w and p are exogenous here, but are endogenous in the generalization presented in Appendix D of the Online Supplement. To ease the exposition, in this section, we use a generic expected revenue function for the retailer, R(q, p), implicitly assuming that the retailer can optimize q for a given p.
Demand for the product depends on the weather, which, for the purposes of the contract, is encapsulated in a summary statistic such as the average temperature in a particular geographic area over a specified time interval. Throughout this paper, we use temperature as an example, although the problem can be similarly formulated with other weather indices, such as precipitation, rain-days, heating-or cooling-degree days, etc. Without loss of generality, suppose that higher temperatures have an adverse impact on demand. In the contracts that we discuss, there is a threshold or "strike" temperature at which the rebate is activated.
First, we introduce our key notation. To avoid trivial solutions, we assume that (i) 0 ≤ v < c < w < p; and (ii) s ≥ 0. Without loss of generality, we assume that the salvage value is normalized to zero and other relevant parameters are adjusted accordingly. We also assume that there is no shortage cost incurred by the manufacturer, apart from the lost gross margin.
Before the retailer chooses q, the manufacturer offers a weather rebate contract of the form:
where k(t, q) is non-decreasing in both t and q. In words, if the retailer orders q units at the beginning of selling season, then under the terms of the contract, the retailer receives compensation k(t, q) from the manufacturer if the realized temperature, t, turns out to be greater than t * , the strike temperature, or nothing otherwise. We will elaborate on the structure of k(t, q) later. The strike temperature is initially assumed to be given and fixed throughout the season, but we discuss the choice of t * later in the paper.
With this weather rebate contract, the retailer's expected profit is
where R(q, p) is the expected net revenue given the retailer's decision q, and
e., the expected revenue from sales less the loss of goodwill. The manufacturer's expected profit is
i.e., the gross margin per unit multiplied by the quantity sold, less the expected rebate payment, and the expected profit for the supply chain is
Denote by q c the quantity that maximizes the expected supply chain profit, π c (q, p), i.e., the system-coordinating solution. We assume that π c (q, p) is continuous in q, so q c exists (although
When there is no rebate, k(t, q) = 0 for all t and q. In this case, the retailer chooses a quantity In the remainder of this section, we first show how to structure a weather-linked rebate to achieve supply chain coordination when demand is monotonic in the weather index. In Appendix A of the Online Supplement we show that these results extend to situations in which demand is non-monotonic in the index. We subsequently derive more specific contract terms when the manufacturer wishes to achieve Pareto improvement.
Supply Chain Coordination
In this subsection, we investigate the possibility of achieving supply chain coordination with weather rebate contracts. Although a very wide range of contract structures can achieve the same result, our presentation here focuses on contracts with simple structures and for which the impact of the parameters is quite clear. Later in this section, we discuss specific contract structures that will coordinate the supply chain.
Theorem 1 shows that a class of weather rebate contracts can coordinate the supply chain.
The structure of this class of rebates bears some similarity to the (target) sales rebates studied by Taylor (2002) , but here the target specifies the minimum purchase quantity (which we call Λ) that qualifies the retailer to participate in the rebate program whereas in Taylor's model, the target is the minimum retail sales quantity above which the retailer earns a rebate. The class of rebates that we explore is extremely broad; we elaborate on this point later.
Theorem 1 Consider a class of weather rebate contracts with the following form:
where the value of Λ ≤ q c is prespecified. With such a contract, the retailer's expected profit is
and the manufacturer's expected profit is
Moreover, q c is the retailer's optimal order quantity , i.e., contracts with this structure coordinate the supply chain.
Proof. Substituting equation (4) into (2) and (3) yields the desired expressions for π r (q, p) and π s (q, p), as asserted.
Observe that the form of the coordinating contract in (4) is extremely flexible; the only requirements are that it satisfies (1) and (4). As such, both the specific form of k(t, q) and the value of t * may be selected by the manufacturer, or negotiated between the two parties. This differs markedly from most other types of coordinating supply contracts, which typically allow for a fairly small class of functional relationships and parameters. For example, in a buyback contract without return limits, a particular relationship between the wholesale price and the buyback price is needed to ensure coordination of the supply chain.
Our first example of a rebate scheme is a constant payout per unit (independent of t) to the retailer for each unit ordered in excess of Λ if the temperature metric (usually average temperature) exceeds t * . That is,
where I {·} = 1 (or 0) if the argument is true (or not true). This scheme has been implemented by companies under different settings. For example, several years ago, Bombardier Inc., a Canadian snowmobile manufacturer, offered an incentive that helped to protect itself against the lower sales and leftover inventory that accompany a mild winter. In the winter of 1998, the company offered buyers in the US Midwest a $1,000 rebate on its snowmobiles if a pre-set amount of snow did not fall that season. (The pre-set amount was half the average snowfall of the past three years, and the price of its snowmobiles ranges from $7,000 to $9,000.) Sales increased 38% from the prior year! (Davis and Meyer 2000) . In this case it appears that Bombardier set Λ = 0 so it assumed considerable risk in offering this rebate.
This concept also applies to rebates that hinge upon extreme weather conditions-not aggregate weather metrics-that might occur during a short time horizon. One example would be snowfall exceeding a threshold (measured in a specific locale) during a weekend day before Payouts on critical-day contracts are linked to relatively "extreme" weather on a number of days over the life of the contract, rather than average weather conditions over the entire period.
The second example is:
where k(·) is an increasing function, and Λ is a constant. Under this rebate, if the temperature exceeds t * , the manufacturer pays the retailer a per unit rebate that depends upon the deviation of t above t * for each unit that the retailer orders in excess of a base quantity, Λ. Unlike the rebate in (7), the per unit rebate amount depends upon t. This rebate can coordinate the chain if k(·) and t * are chosen to satisfy (4). Contracts of this general form are often used in connection with heating (cooling) degree days or other aggregate weather metrics. Evolution Markets, a firm that sells customized weather derivatives, provides a case study on a derivative designed for a brewery whose demand falls in cool weather.
The payout depended upon the shortfall of cooling degree days from the strike value (see http://new.evomarkets.com/pdf documents/EvoWth nyc brewery.pdf). Because this derivative was offered by a third party and not by an upstream supplier, the payout was not a function of the order quantity, but the example shows that firms are considering weather contracts that depend upon the deviation of the observed temperature metric from a threshold.
From (4), we can see that the retailer makes a side payment of (w − c)Λ to the manufacturer in exchange for a discount of w − c per unit on his entire order quantity. Although this weather rebate contract appears to have the structure of a two-part tariff, the risks faced by the two parties are different under the two contracts. Under a two-part tariff, the retailer makes an advance purchase of the coordinating quantity and bears all of the risk. Under the weather rebate contract, the manufacturer receives a deterministic risk premium but bears an amount of risk that depends upon t * , and thus, can be controlled via this parameter.
Pareto-Improving Rebates
Recall that the manufacturer's motivation for offering a weather rebate is to induce the retailer to order more than he would in the absence of a rebate. We have shown in Section 3.1 that for a given w, a weather rebate of the form (4) is able to coordinate the supply chain. But some retailers may be unwilling to participate in a rebate scheme if it is accompanied by a higher wholesale price. Therefore, we first wish to determine whether it is possible to construct a coordinating weather rebate with w = w d where w d is the manufacturer's chosen wholesale price in the absence of rebate (i.e., the "decentralized" solution). (Lariviere and Porteus 2001 has identified fairly general conditions under which the optimal wholesale price is uniquely chosen by the manufacturer, whereas here it need not be optimal.)
We first note that if w = w d , the retailer is better off in expectation under any rebate structure. If he does not like the terms of the rebate, he can simply order his decentralized order quantity q r . Thus, if he agrees to the terms of the rebate and orders more than q r , he is assuming additional risk entirely of his own volition. On the other hand, if Λ is too large, then the retailer could be worse off if he accepts this contract.
To obtain a feasible range of Λ such that a Pareto-improving solution is obtained under the rebate scheme defined by (1) and (4) When Λ = q r , the retailer chooses q = q c , so the manufacturer's profit remains equal to
This means that the retailer gains all the incremental channel profit. A strict inequality holds when w > c in (9) . Also note that for all Λ < q r , the manufacturer is worse off (in expectation)
under the rebate scheme. Therefore, Λ = q r is a lower bound on Pareto-improving values of Λ.
, meaning that the manufacturer takes all the incremental profit while the retailer's profit remains the same as that without a rebate scheme. For all
the retailer is worse off accepting the rebate scheme. Thus, this value represents an upper bound on the Pareto improving Λ. LetΛ denote this upper bound, which is clearly capped by
To summarize, for both parties to be better off with the introduction of the rebate scheme defined by (4), the value of Λ must be set within the range (Λ,Λ).
We now investigate whether a weather rebate is guaranteed to make both parties better off if it is accompanied by a wholesale price higher than
We have the following result, the proof of which appears in Appendix B of the Online Supplement. Finally, we need to check whether a high value of w could lead to a situation where Λ w >Λ so that a Pareto-improving rebate would not exist. Because 
Limiting the Manufacturer's Risk
In this section, we discuss two ways in which the manufacturer may limit his risk: (i) via his choice of parameters for the coordinating contract described in the previous section and (ii)
via the purchase of a weather derivative.
Limiting Risk via the Choice of t * and K(t * , q)
In the previous section, we assumed that the value of t * was set exogenously. It is, however, one feature of the weather rebate that makes it distinctive. If the manufacturer sets t * to a very high value, then he will pay the rebate infrequently but the payout for each such instance will be large. On the other hand, if the manufacturer sets t * to a low value, the structure of the contract approaches that of a full-value markdown arrangement on units purchased in excess of q r . Provided that K(t * , q) is defined so that (4) is satisfied, both the manufacturer's and retailer's expected profits remain the same for all values of t * . Thus, t * can be adjusted-or perhaps negotiated-according to the risk preferences of the two parties.
Suppose the manufacturer wants to impose a constraint on the probability that he is worse off in the presence of the rebate, i.e.,
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is pre-specified. Note that without the rebate, the manufacturer earns a risk-free profit (w − c)q r . Here, we use a specific form of the manufacturer's chance constraint, but (w − c)q r can be replaced by any constant value and the same types of conclusions can be drawn from the analysis.
First consider the rebate scheme
constraint can be reinterpreted as
In the special case where Λ = q r , this becomes
In this case, the manufacturer only needs to set t * so that his downside risk is contained.
We note that other types of risk constraints can be handled, albeit with more complex algebra, provided that the risk metric is monotonic in t * . As such, metrics based on conditional value at risk (CVaR) may also be employed. Material in the business press suggests that manufacturers are not necessarily trying to offset all risks, but are instead attempting to hedge against moderately bad (or worse) outcomes, as was true in the case of Weatherproof.
As such, chance constraints similar to those mentioned above and constraints on CVaR are able to reflect these concerns, which are the same types of concerns expressed by retailers.
(For further details, see the web sites of the weather risk management firms cited in the Introduction.)
Note that so long as the rebate contract satisfies (4), the supply chain will be coordinated, irrespective of t * . However, in a non-coordinating rebate contract, the choice of t * can have an impact on the allocation of profit between the parties. To see this effect, consider what happens when all contract parameters are held constant but the strike temperature is reduced to t * * < t * , where t * satisfies (4) but t * * does not. Then,
implying that the retailer will earn more than he would with the coordinated contract.
The impact of k in (8) is similar: holding all else constant, the retailer gains more in expectation with a larger k. However, with a larger k, the lower limit on t * increases, so the retailer experiences greater variability in his profit: he will be paid larger rebate payments less frequently. (The variability of the manufacturer's profit also increases for the same reason.)
Weather Derivatives to Hedge the Risk of Rebate Offers
In this subsection, we show that a weather derivative-with appropriate characteristics-gives the manufacturer a riskless means to offer a rebate (by paying a fixed premium). So whether the manufacturer should purchase the weather derivative depends upon the amount of the premium, his own risk attitude and other means available for mitigating risk.
Here we take the average temperature as an example and consider a call option with the following characteristics. The agreed-upon strike (average) temperature ist, and the manufac- 
Suppose that the manufacturer can choose t * =t. By aligning the form of the option and the strike temperature in the option with those in the rebate scheme offered to the retailer, the manufacturer can transfer all of the weather risks to the derivative writer. This can be shown as follows.
Consider the rebate scheme 
so that the chain will be coordinated. In particular, letting L = q c − Λ and
, the chain can be coordinated.
However, with a coordinating rebate contract combined with weather call options, the manufacturer's profit becomes
and the retailer's profit is
Note that hereafter we use the superscript o to represent the case with weather options.
As mentioned earlier, in a competitive market, When a risk premium has to be paid for the weather options, i.e.,
Thus, as long as π o c (q c , p) > π c (q r , p), the options can increase the supply chain profit.
To illustrate these points, we present a simple example in which the product is an inexpensive and for each two degree increase in temperature, demand falls about 1.3% (for 60 < t < 80).
There is great deal of inherent uncertainty in the demand, even apart from the weather, which is captured in the distribution of U . The optimal centralized order quantity is q c = 9, 263, while in the decentralized supply chain (without a rebate) the retailer's optimal order quantity is q r = 6, 612. The decentralized solution yields a total supply chain profit of $59,492 whereas the coordinated solution gives the retailer of profit of $26,422 and the manufacturer a profit of $33,060 for a total of $66,120, or an improvement of 11% for the supply chain as a whole.
Suppose the weather option is defined as Thus, as long as the total risk premium for the five options is less than $6,628, the supply chain profit can be improved when the manufacturer uses the weather options.
Note that the manufacturer must pay a premium up front for each option. However, as so the manufacturer earns $2,660 (or 8%) more risk-free. Alternatively, the manufacturer can keep w = w d = 10 but set Λ = q r + 532. Then, he also earns $2,660 more (after deducting the option premium). However, note that although the retailer also earns a higher profit (i.e., $2,923 (or 11%) more in expectation), he bears a higher risk (from ordering 2,651 more units).
Thus far, we have assumed that the manufacturer offers the retailer a coordinating contract.
In Appendix C, we explore what happens if the retailer purchases a weather derivative in a decentralized supply chain. We demonstrate that both the supplier's profit and the systemwide profit improve when the manufacturer offers the retailer a non-coordinating contract with exactly the same structure that the retailer could purchase independently, and that the retailer's expected profit is the same under both scenarios. The manufacturer can then completely hedge his risk of offering the weather rebate by purchasing an equivalent weather derivative.
In this section, we have discussed two ways in which the manufacturer can limit his risk: by the choice of t * and via the purchase of a weather derivative. In the next section, we discuss one way to limit the retailer's risk.
Limiting the Retailer's Risk
Weather contracts typically require the retailer to make a larger financial commitment up front in exchange for risk mitigation at a later date. A retailer may be unwilling to make the additional up-front commitment if the subsequent risk mitigation does not meet his expectations.
In this section, we explore one approach for limiting the risk incurred by the retailer.
We consider an extension of our basic model with fixed wholesale and retail prices. Both parties seek to maximize their own expected profit and the retailer imposes a probabilistic constraint specifying that the probability that his profit falls below a threshold, α, should be no greater than β. Constraints of this type are popular in the finance literature to capture bankruptcy risk, and in broader contexts to capture participation or risk constraints in stochastic settings. We show how to structure the weather rebate so that it provides (weak)
Pareto improvement while the retailer's risk constraint is satisfied.
Here, we assume the manufacturer is risk neutral, but note that the risk mitigation mechanisms described in Subsection 3.1 and Section 4 may be used to limit the manufacturer's risk.
For ease of exposition, we only consider a rebate of the form given in (8) . We also assume the shortage cost beyond the loss of profit is zero, which simplifies the analysis and exposition.
Without a Rebate
The retailer's problem is
where NR denotes "no rebate." For the value of q selected by the retailer, the manufacturer's
If q < α p−w then it is impossible to satisfy the retailer's risk constraint. Let q α = α p−w , i.e., the threshold value of q above which there is a positive probability that the retailer will achieve a profit α (or higher). Then the probability that the retailer's profit fails to reach α for an order quantity, q, is
Note that the probability of failing to achieve a profit of α is increasing with q, so there is an inherent tradeoff between increasing expected profit (which increases with q up to the unconstrained optimum) and keeping the probability of failing to achieve a profit of α low.
Let q N R r be the unconstrained optimal order quantity in the absence of a rebate, i.e., q N R r = arg max q π N R r (q). Then for given values of q and d, d ≤ q, the retailer's profit is: dp
which is less than or equal to α if d ≤
. Therefore, we have:
}, then the optimal order quantity isq r whereq r is the maximum value of q that satisfies the downside risk constraint, i.e.,
} < β, then the optimal order quantity is the unconstrained solution, q N R r .
From the above, we can conclude that if Pr{D(t, u) ≤ q α } < β, the retailer's optimal (constrained) order quantity when there is no rebate isq N R r = min{q N R r ,q N R r }.
With a rebate
Here, we set Λ =q N R r (the constrained optimal order quantity when there is no rebate) in a manner analogous to what we did in the risk-neutral setting. Later in this subsection, we discuss how the contract parameters affect risks in a broader sense.
The retailer's problem becomes
and the manufacturer's profit is
Let q R r denote the (unconstrained) order quantity that maximizes the retailer's expected profit when the manufacturer offers a rebate. To ensure that q R r is finite, we require that 
We know that H(q r ) = 
if t > t * , so the retailer's profit is α or less if
and if d ≥ q the profit is
which is a deterministic profit and is always greater than α for q > q α = α/(p − w).
Similarly, for q <q N R r , the retailer's profit is
if t ≤ t * , so the retailer's profit is α or less if
which again is a deterministic quantity that is less (greater) than α for q less (greater) than α/(p − w). This is the same as in the no-rebate case.
From the foregoing analysis, we can write
If q R r satisfies the risk constraint, then we are done. Otherwise, we need to identify the best constrained solution. Under the assumption that k(t − t * ) > 0 for all t > t * , for any q >q N R r , the expression on the right hand side of the third entry in (26) is strictly less than
In other words, due to the potential for receiving a rebate, not surprisingly, the probability that the retailer's profit falls short of the threshold α declines for any fixed q. Thus, there exists some q >q N R r such that the risk constraint is still satisfied. Letq R r be the largest value of q for which the third entry on the right hand side of (26) is less than or equal to β. Then the constrained optimal order quantity,q R r is equal to min(q R r , q R r ).
To determine whether the rebate is Pareto-improving (in expectation) for the retailer, we consider all possible types of outcomes and compare the solutions with and without a rebate.
These are shown in Because q is never smaller when a rebate is offered and the retailer is never forced to order more than his unconstrained solution (with or without a rebate offer), the retailer is always at least as well off in expectation when the rebate is offered.
Now we turn to the manufacturer's profit in (18) . Taking the expectation over t yields
Under the rebate scheme, we have
, which implies that for each unit that the retailer orders in excess ofq N R r , the expected rebate payout by the manufacturer is equal to his gross margin. Thus, for any q ≥q N R r , the manufacturer is not strictly better off in expectation if he offers the rebate. We have already shown that the retailer is strictly better off in expectation if he chooses an order quantity that makes him eligible for a rebate.
Thus, the manufacturer can take part of the incremental profit by setting a larger "threshold" quantity (i.e., Λ >q N R r ). As such, even when the retailer imposes a downside risk constraint, the weather rebate leaves both parties at least as well off in expectation as they were in the absence of a rebate. Observe that the manufacturer still has the option to choose t * to limit his risk. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 4, any additional risk borne by the manufacturer can often be hedged using a weather derivative.
Without a Rebate
With Rebate Offer Constrained Unconstrained Constrained q is larger w/rebate q is larger w/rebate Not constrained but no rebate inconsistent same solutions
Unconstrained q is larger w/rebate q is larger w/rebate 
Conclusions
We have introduced and analyzed weather rebate contracts for newsvendor settings that can achieve supply chain coordination and allow an arbitrary allocation of profits between the two parties. The proposed class of rebates also provides Pareto improvement without the need to increase the existing wholesale price. More importantly, unlike other rebates designed to address issues surrounding excess end-of-season inventory, no inventory or markdown audits are necessary for enforcement of truth-telling and the contract does not have an adverse effect on sales effort. As such, the contract is easy to implement.
The class of contracts is also extremely flexible, allowing a wide range of functional forms
and parameter values (such as the strike "temperature" at which the rebate is activated), which allow risk preferences of the two parties to be reflected more easily.
The rebate also can be incorporated when the parties can choose prices, and this is true whether the retailer must choose his price when he orders or closer to the selling season when improved weather information is available. We analyze both cases in Appendix D of the Online Supplement. Results for the case of power function demand reveal that the retailer's ability to price late and the weather rebate both have multiplicative (> 1) effects on profits in a compounding fashion, but the multiplicative effect of the weather rebate is not as strong when the retailer prices late, so late pricing and the weather rebate are partial substitutes. Both provide risk mitigation to the retailer while increasing his expected profit, and the manufacturer still obtains incremental benefits from the contract when the retailer prices late.
At this writing, financial services firms are beginning to offer business insurance policies to hedge against weather risk. Financial executives may be in a position to take advantage of these offerings. However, inventory managers and buyers rarely have the authority to purchase weather derivatives. On the other hand, they can accept the offer of a weather rebate from a manufacturer in the same way as they can agree to a buy-back contract or a markdown agreement. As such, forward-thinking manufacturers may be well-positioned to design and offer weather rebate contracts that would be attractive to their customers, thereby gaining a competitive advantage in the marketplace and simultaneously increasing their own profits.
Online Supplement Appendix A: Model with Non-monotonic d(p, t)
Here we assume that the retail price is exogenously given, thus
is a deterministic function of t, but the temperature itself is a random variable.) We model a situation in which d(t) is non-monotonic but unimodal in t, first strictly increasing as t increases, then strictly decreasing. (Generalization to accommodate general unimodal functions is straightforward.) With such a representation, for each demandd, there is a unique pair of
We can then write the retailer's expected profit as:
Taking the derivative with respect to q and simplifying, we obtain:
Although this expression is slightly more complicated that in the case of a monotonic d(t), it has the same basic structure. Consequently, the results for monotonic d(t) also extend to the case of unimodal d(t).
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2
First consider the manufacturer. To make the rebate attractive to the manufacturer, it must be such that
where the term in brackets on the left hand side is the expected profit of the manufacturer when the rebate is offered with the wholesale price being set at w ≥ w d , and the second term is that without the rebate. By (4), a Pareto-improving rebate scheme exists for the manufacturer if
If the retailer orders q ≥ Λ, then the condition becomes for some value of t * . Note that the derivative does not depend upon q because the derivative writer would not be concerned about q. For any arbitrary k(t) and t * , we must have
where q D r is the quantity that the retailer decides to purchase in view of the derivative. For the purposes of this discussion, it is not critical how the retailer chooses q D r . Clearly, there exists some ∆ > 0 such that the above equality is satisfied. If ∆ ≥ w − c, then there would exist a Λ ≥ 0 such that the supply chain could be coordinated (cf. (4)), so without loss of generality, we assume that ∆ < w − c.
Suppose that the retailer pays a premium of B ≥ 0 for the derivative. Then the retailer's expected profit becomes:
where q D r is the retailer's order quantity when he purchases a derivative. If the retailer is risk-neutral, he will order the same quantity as in the absence of the derivative and will be worse off. But a risk-averse retailer generally will order more when he purchases the derivative, and the additional expected profit may cover the risk premium. Assume this is the case, as this is a premise of this analysis. The retailer is better off, and the manufacturer is better off because of the larger order quantity.
Suppose now that the manufacturer offers a weather rebate equivalent to a weather derivative that the retailer would choose to purchase from a third party and charges the same premium.
The retailer's decisions and expected profit remain the same as when the derivative is offered by a third party. The supplier's profit becomes:
The expression for the supplier's profit in (31) reveals that the profit gains are due to a risk reduction for the retailer that is equivalent to a reduction in double-marginalization from w − c to w − c − ∆, and this applies to both the weather derivative purchased from a third party and the weather rebate secured from the manufacturer.
, the manufacturer is worse off and will choose not to offer the weather rebate, but typically B > ∆q D r = ∞ t * k(t)f (t)dt, i.e., the risk premium is positive, so the supplier's expected profit is greater than if the retailer purchases an equivalent derivative from a third party. The supply chain is better off than under the retailer-purchased derivative because the risk premium is simply transferred between the two parties rather than being paid to a third party. Furthermore, if the manufacturer would like to eliminate his risk from offering the weather rebate, he can simply purchase a weather derivative with exactly the same characteristics as the weather contract that he offers to the retailer. The risk premium is transferred from the retailer to the third party via the manufacturer, so the supplier no longer captures the risk premium, but the benefits to both parties due to reduced double marginalization remain. 
Model with Price Postponement
We assume that events unfold as follows. The manufacturer, as the Stackelberg leader, sets the wholesale price. The retailer then decides his purchase quantity, q, based upon a temperature distribution that may be a Bayesian prior or based on historical data-or any other source, long before the selling season starts. (For notational simplicity, we omit the subscript r.) Then, the retailer observes an unbiased signal of the weather (e.g., an accurate forecast of the average temperature during the selling season) at the beginning of the selling season, which can be viewed as a draw from his distribution at the beginning of the season, and sets the selling price accordingly. In reality, the weather signal may not be unbiased or accurate and the retailer can change the price during the season to adapt to actual market and weather conditions.
Our reason for adopting these particular assumptions is to reflect the facts that the ordering decision must be made before accurate weather information is available, and that the retailer has the flexibility to choose a price (or a trajectory of prices) in view of the (more accurate)
weather information at the beginning of and/or during the selling season. We recognize that this is simply an approximation, but we believe it is a more reasonable representation than simply assuming that the retailer must set the price long before the selling season starts.
We assume that any shortage cost beyond the loss of profit is zero. This assumption is not without loss of generality but it simplifies the technical analysis and exposition.
We consider a retail demand function D(p, t, u) consisting of two parts: (1) a riskless part,
which is a deterministic function that is decreasing in the retail price p and is non-increasing in t, and (2) a random part, U , a non-negative random variable defined over a finite support [A, B) with mean µ (> 0), distribution G(u) and density g (u) . We assume that the demand uncertainty takes the multiplicative form:
We assume T and U are independent random variables and d(p, t) is decreasing in both p and t. Without loss of generality, we also assume that E(U ) = µ = 1.
From a technical standpoint, the multiplicative model of demand uncertainty is more amenable to analysis, but we believe that it is also a more realistic representation of the demand uncertainty caused by weather variability, namely that the demand uncertainty is higher when the mean is higher. In other words, it is more difficult to predict extreme (high) demands in conditions when the weather is expected to increase the (average) forecasted demand.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we present two assumptions regarding the deterministic and random components of the demand that apply in the remainder of this section.
Assumption 1 The function d(p, t) is decreasing in both p and t and has increasing price elasticity (IPE) for any given t, where the price elasticity is defined as
η(p, t) = −p d d (≥ 1).
Assumption 2 The random variable U has an increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR).
Discussion of Assumptions 1 and 2. The IPE property is intuitive: as the price increases, the demand decreases by a larger percentage, which eventually makes it less desirable to raise the price further. Many commonly-used demand functions in the literature satisfy the IPE assumption. (For examples, see Chen et al. 2004 ). If η(p) < 1 for all p, i.e., the product is price-insensitive, then the price should be set to the maximum possible level. IGFR is a generalization of IFR, so the set of distributions satisfying the IGFR property is a superset of those satisfying the IFR property (Lariviere, 1999) . The IGFR property is satisfied by almost all theoretical distributions used in the operations management literature (see Petruzzi and Dada, 1999; and Chen et al. 2004 ).
As in the previous section, we model the situation as a manufacturer-Stackelberg game. The difference here is that the retailer's problem is now a two-stage stochastic program. In the second stage (after the temperature signal is observed), the retailer optimizes p given the q that was decided before the beginning of the selling season and the observed t. In the first stage (before the temperature signal is observed), the retailer optimizes q in view of the distribution of T and his optimal price for each outcome t.
The Retailer's Problem
Because the retailer's problem is a two-stage stochastic program, we solve the problem by backward induction. At the beginning of the selling season (the second stage of the stochastic program), the retailer chooses the optimal price p * (q, t) with q and t given.
The retailer's profit is given by
where
, and w is the wholesale price offered by the manufacturer. The expression [1 − Θ(·)] can be interpreted as the fill-rate (fraction of demand satisfied from stock) given q.
The partial derivative of the profit function in (32) with respect to p for fixed q and t is
where λ(
0 ug(u)du. In the following, we will use d and p(q) to represent d(p, t) and p(q, t), respectively, to simplify the exposition, until it is necessary to make the dependence on t explicit.
We characterize the retailer's profit function in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, for any given order quantity q (≥ 0) and temperature t: (a) the retailer's expected profit function
and does not depend on w.
Proof. To simplify the exposition, in the proof we use d to represent d(p, t).
(a) We first show that Π r (p|q, t) is unimodal in p for fixed q and t. The partial derivative of the profit function in (32) with respect to p for fixed q and t is given by (33) .
Rearranging the right hand side of (33), we have
where v(z) = , cannot be zero or negative in an optimal solution with positive profit. Thus, in an optimal solution, the price must equate the expression in square brackets to zero, i.e., the optimal price satisfies
Taking the derivatives of both sides with respect to q gives
where p = dp dq . In the above expression, the first term on the left hand side is non-positive and the term in square brackets is non-negative (because v < 0, d < 0 and η > 0). Hence, we must have p ≤ 0, i.e., p * (q, t) is non-increasing in q.
(c) We next show that p * (q, t) is increasing in t for fixed q. Note that d is non-decreasing in t if p is fixed, so q/d is increasing in t if q and p are fixed. Consider t 1 < t 2 and the optimal price for t 1 
(by (36)). As a result, the optimal price is lower if the temperature increases.
(d) Finally, we show that p * (q, t) is independent of w. This is evident from the fact that p for a fixed q and t is determined by (34) which is independent of w.
It should be noted that part (c) only requires monotonicity of d(p, t) with respect to t. The other results do not require any conditions on how d(p, t) depends on t.
It is worth mentioning that our method of analysis is similar to that of Song et al. (2008) , but in our model, demand is influenced by the weather (temperature) and the deterministic part of the demand function is also slightly more general.
We now turn to the first stage of the retailer's stochastic program. The retailer optimizes q in view of the distribution of T and his optimal pricing strategy discussed above. His expected profit prior to the temperature observation is:
The first derivative w.r.t. q yields the following first-order condition (after simplification):
The following theorem shows that the optimal solution is defined by the first order condition and provides a monotonicity result that is useful in solving the manufacturer's problem.
< 0 for all t. Therefore, the optimal q can be determined from the first order condition in (39) for a given w. Moreover, the optimal order quantity is strictly decreasing in w.
Proof. We first show that Π r (q) is concave in q. Rearranging and simplifying the terms in (37) and making appropriate substitutions, we have that
because p ≤ 0. We use this result below.
Using the shorthand notation p = p(q, t), the first and second derivatives w.r.t. q are:
where the last inequality follows because
Before the temperature is observed, the expected profit of the retailer is π r (q) =
and thus π r (q) is concave in q.
We now show that the retailer's optimal order quantity is strictly decreasing in w. Suppose to the contrary that q(w 2 ) ≥ q(w 1 ) where w 1 < w 2 . By (40) we know that We now turn to the manufacturer's problem.
The Manufacturer's Problem
Following Lariviere and Porteus (2001) among others, we express the manufacturer's maximization problem in terms of the quantity q. Although this may be unusual, as we showed in Theorem 4, the retailer's first order condition (39) defines a strictly monotonic mapping between w and q, so the manufacturer can solve his optimization in the domain of q values (knowing the retailer's optimal pricing strategy p * (q, t)) and then map the solution back to an optimal solution for w.
The manufacturer's profit maximization problem, π s (w) = wq − cq, can be expressed as:
s.t. (34) where the constraint implicitly defines the optimal price for each (q, t) pair. Nevertheless, due to the strict monotonicity of (39), we know that the retailer's solution q * is unique for fixed w. So, to optimize π s (q), a unidimensional search on w is sufficient, although, in general we cannot solve for w * in closed form. Alternatively, in view of the above results, we can solve the problem as follows: (1) for each q and t, compute p * (q, t) using (34), with discretization of q and t to any desired precision; (2) conduct a unidimensional search on q to optimize (41) , with a resultant optimal q * ; and (3) finally, use (39) to obtain w * .
Model without Price Postponement
We argued in the previous subsection that retailers can usually postpone their pricing decisions until better information is known about the weather. We refer to this as the "price late" case.
There are instances, however, where the retailer has restricted latitude in changing prices, such as catalog sales, where the catalog must be printed before accurate weather information is available. There are other situations in which the retailer does not have (or wish to commit) the resources to adjust prices in response to the weather. We consider such situations in this subsection. Here, the retailer needs to decide both the price and order quantity before observing the temperature. We refer to this as the "price early" case.
Given w, the retailer's expected profit is
Taking the first derivatives of the retailer's profit with respect to q and p, respectively and setting them equal to zero, we obtain:
Although (43) is relatively well-behaved under certain conditions, (44) is much more complicated, and the retailer's objective function may not be jointly unimodal in p and q. However, if d(p, t) and the distribution of U have relatively simple analytic forms, it is possible to obtain closed-form solutions. Thus, the results are situation-specific. We present an example later in this section.
We now explain how to incorporate a weather rebate into the "price early" and "price late" models.
Incorporating a Weather Rebate
For the "price late" scenario, the system-optimal order quantity can be obtained by substituting c for w on the left hand side of (39) . For the "price early" scenario, under the conditions discussed in the previous section, one can similarly substitute c for w in (43) to obtain the system-coordinating quantity. Let q c denote this quantity and q d denote the decentralized solution obtained as described above.
(These values will, in general, differ for the "price early"
and "price late" scenarios.) To achieve supply chain coordination, we can again use a rebate of the form (4) Table 2 provides a comparison of price early and price late cases (before and after the retailer observes the weather condition, respectively), with and without a weather rebate. We first make a few general observations. First, the expected retail price (averaged across demand levels as influenced by the temperature) is exactly the same whether the retailer prices early or late assuming that a contract either is, or is not, in force. Second, given the presence or absence of a contract, the retailer's order quantity when he can price late is D a(t) dt. Using Jensen's inequality and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, it can be shown that this factor is greater than 1. Thus, the retailer not only has more units to sell but because of his pricing flexibility, he can extract additional gains when demand is high that more than offset his losses when demand is low. Third, in the absence of a contract, the supply chain profit in the "price late" case
times as large as it is in the "price early" case and the magnitude of this ratio is determined in an intricate way by the impact of temperature on demand. But in the presence of a contract, it is D β 1 · D 2 times as large. Because β > 1, (2β − 1)/(β − 1) > 1, and hence the proportional increase in the supply chain profit is smaller with a weather rebate than without one. In particular, the introduction of the weather rebate magnifies the order quantity by a multiplicative factor of (w/c) β . These changes in the order quantities eventually lead to the supply chain profit being ( 
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K(t
D 2 = ∞ −∞ f (t) a(t) dt.
